uncontested sets of norms and practises; but rather they are socially constructed from different conceptual frameworks.
Taking this idea further, scholars in a wide range of fields, such as socio-legal studies, 22 sociology, 23 and economics, 24 argue that the tacit assumptions and norms embedded within people shape the conceptual frameworks they find compelling. According to Felstiner, Able, and Sarat, it is these frameworks that actors turn to when attributing blame in disputes. A core question considered in this book is whether land disputes are more easily resolved when the main actors, both state and non-state, share conceptually compatible frameworks and generally agree about the cause of the dispute and the appropriate outcomes. Conversely, do negotiations break down and disputes become intractable when actors lack compatible frameworks for determining blame and redress?
Particularly in rapidly transforming societies, 25 such as socialist-transforming Asia, diverse educational, economic, and social experiences generate differences in the distribution of knowledge. This fragmentation of knowledge produces a diversity of conceptual frameworks. As the case studies in this book demonstrate, the most intractable land disputes seem to occur at knowledge boundaries found, for example, at the periurban interface between globally connected cities and farming communities. 22 See generally Susan Silbey, "After Legal Consciousness" (2005) Drawing on the authors' studies, it is possible to identify three main frameworks used to conceptualize land disputes in Socialist Asia. In practise, the actors involved in disputes rarely rely on just one framework and often interweave ideas from one framework into another. Before discussing the ramifications of this blurring and hybridization, we discuss the three main conceptual frameworks below.
Seeing like a state
James Scott argues that the process of simplification, codification, and standardizationmuch of what land laws, cadastral plans, and land titles do-is an essential aspect of governing modern states. 26 Because societies more often than not comprise "a reality so complex and variegated as to defy easy short-hand description," states must first transform societies into "neat constructs of science" before they can govern. 27 This regulatory technology enables states to govern without fine-grained knowledge about everyday practices-to govern at a distance on a large scale. To recreate the modernist ideal of orderly planned cities and industrial agriculture, governments throughout East Asia imported European planning schemes and land titling systems.
28
A central aspect of modernist land management is governance through codification and abstraction. This transformation assumes a shift from particularism to universalism and from substantive to procedural justice. Authors in this book query if this transformation 26 uniformly applies to China and Vietnam (see Chapters 8 9, and 11). 29 Although they point to increased codification, the case studies also show the ongoing importance of interpersonal relationships, the treatment of each land dispute as sui generis, and as a consequence, the lack of general principles that apply predictably and systematically to every case. In Chapter 4, Jie Cheng makes the additional point that litigants are most likely to win land cases by challenging the exercise of official powers rather than questioning procedural defects. All of this suggests that "seeing like a state" takes on a different form in socialist East Asia than in western Europe.
Scott also notes that officials are not content with merely promoting state governance; in "seeing like a state," they displaced rival modes of regulation. For example, officials use laws to define boundaries of control and discredit or omit practises that were considered inconvenient or resistant to control. Nowhere was this approach more obvious than in the Soviet land planning introduced into China and Vietnam during the 1960s. 30 Revolutionary governments in Europe and Asia sought to sweep away backward traditional cultures that had become associated with class oppression and feudalism.
Marx followed a well-established European intellectual tradition that depicted Asian societies in undifferentiated ways as "semi-barbarians," portrayals that generated socialist antipathy, or at least indifference, to neo-Confucian and "feudal" culture. 31 To varying degrees, governments in China and Vietnam believed that a universal "proletarian 29 There is another distinctly modernizing feature of land law and planning. As Michael Lief 36 observed in relation to peri-urban China and Vietnam:
[t]he expansion of urban administrative structures into formerly rural settings is understood to be an effort not only to regulate urbanization, to bring villagers' spontaneous activities in line with the laws of the state, but to rein in their frontier lawlessness more broadly, to "civilize" the countryside.
In short, state regulation aims to displace the "local personalism of traditional village practices," which must be wiped away before villagers can join modern society. 
Neo-liberal property rights
International pressure from foreign governments, international donor agencies, and foreign investors has also shaped internal debates about land reform in China and Other theorists are less certain than de Soto that "with each new year, the link between economic prosperity and property rights protection becomes increasingly clearer." 52 They criticize de Soto for drawing too sharp a distinction between state-backed property rights and self-regulation. 53 In their estimation, it is questionable whether systems based on inalienable property rights provide the most effective mechanism where there is ambiguity about access to land and the resolution of disputes. 54 Property rights, they maintain, do little to change disparities in wealth and power that animate many land contests.
Adding to the mounting criticism, still other scholars 55 What these countries clearly demonstrate is that capitalism and democracy, or at least, liberal political values, play a major role in protecting property rights in society. Yet, even in highly developed legal systems, property rights become fuzzy when they collide with customary land claims. In sum, land communities differ in the way in which they embed property relationships in wider sets of social, political, and economic relationships. "Embeddedness" is used here as a metaphor to indicate the relative extent to which property relates to legal, social, and economic domains. Different degrees and kinds of embeddedness are illustrated in the four land communities discussed below. 
Community conceptualizations of land disputes

One: Traditional land communities
Two: Spontaneous land communities
Spontaneous land communities arise when residents who live in the same area, or citizens connected through the mass and/or personal media, come together to oppose land developments (see Chapters 5, 7, and 11). 79 Spontaneous communities differ from traditional communities in that they lack strong organizational structures and coherent sets of regulatory traditions that are capable of galvanizing collective resistance. As the case studies in this book show, spontaneous land communities organize collective action around agents of change. These entities play a crucial role in coordinating collective action, filtering and constituting ideas, and keeping people connected.
Although most spontaneous land communities discussed by the authors (see Chapters 8, 9, and 11) were physically connected to a geographical location, the growing use of 79 
Intersecting land communities
Land disputes are often characterized as clashes between modernity and tradition; however, the multi-embeddedness of property rights discussed above suggests shortcomings with this view. Most land communities discussed in this book drew from modernity and tradition to legitimize their property rights. In China and Vietnam, where land must be converted and expropriated for economic development purposes, land-taking is highly contentious, not just because it affects the economic interest of individuals and communities. Upham notes that, "land not only has economic value; it also constitutes the basis for social relations through the creation of individual, group, and community identities." Land disputes are also contentious because they shape political, social, and legal institutions and the political economy.
Land expropriation is a core component of the economic growth policy in China and
Vietnam, and the party-state, authoritarian at its core, proves to be highly efficient in achieving its developmental agenda. In China, land appropriation takes place at great speed and through simple procedures. Unsurprisingly, this authoritarian efficiency generates disputes and conflict on a massive scale. The party-state, while aware of the complications, has been trying to submerge land disputes in mediation for ad hoc resolution to achieve short-term social harmony. Mediation may preempt social contention in the short-term, but it does not resolve underlying conflicts, and in the longterm, the process may generate more conflict than the original dispute. According to Upham, mediation may be damaging in two unique ways. First, mediation encourages "expressive violence" among the weaker parties, or "mob culture" of a sort, to counter the powerful developers and the government. Secondly, mediation creates a parallel system that is independent of, and competes with, formal judicial institutions and procedures. In the long-term, it undermines the legitimacy of law and the political system. Land expropriation creates tremendous social trauma that may not be avoidable in economic transition, but a better-designed dispute resolution system that is transparent, participatory, and responsive may reduce the harm and produce long-term stability.
Country case studies
This book is divided into four sections that deal with case studies in China, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Each country section begins with a chapter introducing the history of land regulation and its connection to contemporary land disputes. The introduction is then followed by chapters providing detailed cases studies about land disputes.
China narrative
In Chapter 3, Chen Lei traces the evolution of China's land tenure system in both rural and urban areas. His chapter sets a historical and institutional context in which the current land law and policy operate. After identifying the defining characteristics of China's land tenure system and pointing out the major problems that generate land disputes, the chapter offers a concise discussion of the recent overhaul of the legal and regulatory framework for land dispute resolution, with a special focus on contentious expropriation of land and the resulting issue of fair compensation. Chen concludes that Chinese law and legal institutions are offering enhanced protection of property rights and creating more meaningful substantive and procedural limits on state powers.
In Chapter 4, Cheng Jie puts the legal system to the test by offering a focused study of practiced in China, is predatory, corrupt, and in any event fundamentally unfair. The current property regime and the politics of expropriation have generated inevitable and often irreconcilable disputes that are bound to recur.
In Chapter 6, Hualing Fu uses the famous Wukan protest against the predatory landtaking as a case study to illustrate the potential of successful political mobilization in protecting property rights. The Wukan protest highlights a commonly observed irony in
China that the government encourages citizens to settle their disputes through law, but at the same time creates multiple barriers to block citizens' access to justice for meaningful legal remedies. In the end, frustrated citizens whose land is taken without proper compensation abandon the law and take the matter into their own hands. In the process, the citizens realize that, if they speak unequivocally and act collectively and firmly, their collective action increases the likelihood for the government to take its own law more seriously. Thus, there emerges the alternative of a mobilization-based trajectory in which people organize themselves and act forcefully on specific social and economic issues.
Organized protest creates better opportunities for dialogue between protesters and the government and for reaching a mutually beneficial result of channeling contentious land disputes back to legal institutions for effective resolution.
In Chapter 7, He Xin provides a more positive interpretation on the potential of courts to offer effective protection of property rights in housing demolition cases. Ordinarily, land disputes are characterized by power disparity between the parties. The disputes take place largely between private citizens as plaintiffs and powerful developers and the government behind them as defendants, and as such, courts are not able to act fairly and effectively to correct the regulatory capture. However, the balance tips toward the plaintiffs when the plaintiffs act collectively and forcefully in and outside the courts to generate enough political pressure so that judges are forced to rule according to law. Public protest within the framework of law, as He frames it, can enhance transparency, accountability, and judicial independence, and as He concludes, the court can be used as an effective public forum for social and legal development. the state is only one of many regulators seeking to control access to land. In each case study, the state lacked the power to unilaterally impose its solutions on the land users and needed to cooperate with the other land communities to find mutually acceptable outcomes. As in China, however, land users had few opportunities to press their case through either formal state forums or via public discourse. It was only by staging civil disobedience campaigns that they leverage a position on the negotiating table.
Taiwan narrative
In gradual consolidation and reform, the court system is now sufficiently independent from the executive arm of government to effectively adjudicate land-taking cases.
In Finally, it is unrealistic to rely entirely on dispute resolution to mitigate land disputes.
Fiscal measures, such as removing the benefits of land sales and taxation, can reduce the incentives for local government to take land and pay low compensation. Urbanization may be inevitable, and land disputes are bound to increase, but responsive fiscal policies, effective anti-corruption enforcement, and enhanced social welfare might alleviate the growing pains that economic transition may inflict on developing nations and their people.
